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Beyond the accounting profession: A professionalisation project in the 
South Korean public sector accounting field 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: We aim to explore how an accounting association and its key members 1) define, 
control, and claim their knowledge; 2) adopt a closure and/or openness policy to enhance 
their status/influence; and 3) respond to structural/institutional forces from international 
organisations or the state in a particular historical context, such as a globalised/neo-
liberalised setting. 
Design/methodology/approach: We draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical tools (field, capital, 
habitus, and doxa) to understand how public sector accrual accounting was defined, and how 
the Korean Association for Government Accounting (KAGA) was formed and represented as 
a group with public sector accounting expertise.  Our research context was the 
implementation of accrual accounting in South Korea between 1997/98, when the Asian 
financial crisis broke out, and 2006/07, when accrual accounting was enforced by legislation.  
We interviewed social actors recognised as public sector accounting experts, in addition to 
examining related documents such as articles in academic journals, newsletters, invitations, 
membership forms, newspaper articles, and curricula vitae (CVs).  
Findings: We found that the key founders of KAGA included some public administration 
professors, who advocated public sector accrual accounting via civil society groups 
immediately after Korea applied to the IMF for bailout loans and a new government was 
formed in 1997/98.  In conjunction with public servants, they defined and designed public 
sector accrual accounting as a measure of public sector reform and as a part of the broader 
government budget process, rather than as an accounting initiative.  They also co-opted 
accounting professors and CPA-qualified accountants through their personal connections, 
based on shared educational backgrounds, to represent the association as a public sector 
accounting experts’ group. 
Originality/value: These findings suggest that the study of the accounting profession cannot 
be restricted to a focus on professional accounting associations and that accounting 
knowledge can be acquired by non-accountants.  Therefore, we argue that the relationship 
between accounting knowledge, institutional forms, and key actors’ strategies is rich and 
multifaceted. 
 




Beyond the accounting profession: A professionalisation project in the 
South Korean public sector accounting field 
1. Introduction 
We aim to contribute to the literature around accounting professionalisation by exploring 
public sector accounting in South Korea (‘Korea’ hereafter).  Accounting professionalisation 
has been an important topic for scholarly attention (Willmott, 1986; Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 
1998, 2002; Ballas, 1998; Hao, 1999; Sian 2006; Yee, 2009, 2012).  While one body of 
literature has highlighted the significance of the claim to and the control of 
accounting/auditing knowledge by accountants’ professional bodies (Abbott, 1988; Walker, 
1991, 2004a, 2004b; Edwards et al., 2007), another stream of research has suggested 
exploring political, economic, and social circumstances beyond the professional associations 
and their professionalisation projects (Burchell et al., 1980; Willmott, 1986; Puxty et al., 
1987; Yapa et al., 2017).  In this theoretical context, we aim to understand how 
professionalisation can be shaped by political, economic, and social environments, as well as 
by human actors.  In particular, we try to explore the strategies of key individual actors in 
their responses to institutional forces, because strategies of key elite members of professional 
associations are supposed to be ‘enabled by wider, societal institutions such as state agencies’ 
(Chua and Poullaos, 1993, p. 693). 
Specifically, we aim to study a professionalisation project of the Korean Association for 
Government Accounting (KAGA).  Specialising in public sector accounting, KAGA was 
formed in 2002 in response to the adoption of accrual accounting in the Korean public sector.  
This was one of the NPM-style (New Public Managementi) recommendations Korea adopted 
in exchange for bailout loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), following the 
Asian financial crisis that broke out in 1997/98.  Prior to this crisis, a doxic public/private 
divide existed, whereby cash accounting was to be practised by public servants in the 
government sector, and accrual accounting by accountants in the private sector.  Thus, 
whereas accrual accounting was an epistemic domain of accounting academics, the cash-
based government budget process was the remit of public administration academics at the 
epistemic level.  However, when the notion of public sector accrual accounting dismantled 
this divide, public servants, accountants, and academics (both from accounting and public 
administration backgrounds) created KAGA.  Through this process, some of KAGA’s key 
members from a public administration background, despite their shallow accounting expertise 
at the early stage, strived to define and control public sector accounting knowledge and to be 
recognised as public sector accounting experts later.  Therefore, we aim to explore how they 
successfully claimed their knowledge and enhanced their legitimacy via the formation and 
development of KAGA. 
We draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical tools to tease out key drivers/outcomes of KAGA’s 
professionalisation for the 10 years after the financial crisis.  Bourdieu’s key theoretical 
notions, such as doxa and habitus, provide a perspective to make sense of interactions 
between structural forces and individual agency.  His suggestion that a study of professions 
should go beyond the focus on the taken-for-granted nature of professional associations 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) is also in line with the directions we take.  Therefore, we 




The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  The subsequent section reviews previous 
studies on professionalisation, and Section 3 elaborates key Bourdieusian notions.  Section 4 
explains the research context and methods utilised, and Section 5 maps out the Korean field.  
Section 6 explores the economic, social, and political context prior to the formation of 
KAGA, and Section 7 analyses how KAGA and its key members established their legitimacy.  
Finally, Section 8 discusses and concludes the paper. 
2. A review of professionalisation literature 
2.1. Closure and openness 
The term ‘profession’ has been defined as ‘legally privileged groups which have managed to 
monopolise to a considerable degree social and economic opportunities’ (Sack, 1983, p. 6).  
‘Professionalisation’ has been defined as a process, whereby ‘an occupational group might 
establish its difference and superiority from a related occupational group’ (Kirkham and Loft, 
1993, p. 508).  In this vein, professional associations are regarded basically as political bodies 
organised to defend their members’ economic interests against other occupational groups 
(Willmott, 1986; Lee, 1996; Caramanis, 1999; Richardson, 2000).  British professional 
accounting bodies originated in the struggle between accountants and lawyers over lucrative 
insolvency work for failed joint stock companies in the late 19th century (Abbott, 1988; 
Walker, 2004a, 2004b; Edwards et al., 2007).  Canadian accountants also organised 
themselves into professional bodies to protect their interests circa 1900 (Richardson, 2000).  
Greek accounting bodies were also seen as ‘primarily political and self-interested bodies’ 
formed to defend their markets in a contemporary globalised world (Caramanis, 1999, p. 189).  
In accordance with these studies, Willmott (1986) labelled professional associations as 
‘private interest government’ (p. 564).  Therefore, these studies suggest that economic 
rewards are a crucial driver for leading accountants to form professional bodies. 
In pursuing their economic interests, a key strategy of accountants has been to claim 
knowledge relevant to the work they tried to monopolise.  The important role played by the 
knowledge possessed by accountants in enhancing their professional authority has been 
recognised (Parker, 1994).  However, Hines (1989) has argued that the claim of knowledge is 
more critical than actual possession of knowledge for the professionalisation quest.  For 
example, British accountants claimed that their exclusive double-entry bookkeeping 
knowledge, rather than lawyers’ legal expertise, formed the foundation for the skills required 
to deal with complicated financial documents involved in bankruptcy and receivership, 
thereby defining these tasks as accounting work (Abbott, 1988; Walker, 2004a, 2004b; 
Edwards et al., 2007).  In essence, as Walker (2004a, 2004b) and Edwards et al. (2007) 
highlighted, successful professionalisation is dependent on how effectively accountants 
define, control, and claim their knowledge as relevant to certain work. 
In addition to the importance of knowledge claims, a more comprehensive Weberian notion 
of ‘closure’ has been widely used in the accounting literature to tease out how professional 
bodies managed to monopolise accounting work.  Closure is defined as a state of ‘regulate[d] 
market conditions in their (professional bodies’) favour, in face of actual or potential 
competition from outsiders, by restricting access to specific opportunities to a limited group 
of eligibles’ (Sack, 1983, p. 5).  Among a number of tools of closure, Royal Charters and/or 
membership/qualifications/designations have often been explored, because they were capable 
of differentiating ‘elite accountants’ from ‘also-accountants’ who also practised less 
prestigious work, such as insurance, loan brokering, and property dealing (Chua and Poullaos, 
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1993, 1998, 2002).  These tools of closure suggest that professionalisation projects have also 
been driven by symbolic interests, such as occupational ascendancy or elitism, as well as 
economic rewards.  Lee (1996) examined the formation of the Society of Accountants in 
Edinburgh (SAE) in the 1850s, and argued that the formation of the SAE not only created an 
economic monopoly but also a social elite.  In the Scottish accountants’ pursuit of social 
status, their monopoly of the usage of the credentials of ‘Chartered Accountants’ secured 
their prestige since the 1850s (Walker, 1991).  In England, a Royal Charter awarded to the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) in the 1880s was critical 
to excluding non-members and to having the legitimacy of the ICAEW’s members 
recognised by lawyers, the public, and the state (Edwards et al., 2007).  In late 19th-century 
colonial Australia, the Incorporated Institute of Accountants in Victoria (VIC) sought to be 
endowed with a Royal Charter from the Colonial Office in London (Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 
1998).  Likewise, Canadian accountants also tried to use the CA designation, which already 
possessed strong symbolic value and was perceived as a key to their professional status circa 
1900 (Richardson, 1987; Poullaos, 2016).  In the post-colonial setting, Annisette (1999) 
argued, the value of membership in the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Trinidad and 
Tobago (ICATT) lay not only in the qualification itself but in the status it represented.  These 
studies suggest that symbolic strategies, such as obtaining a Royal Charter and monopolising 
the CA designation, are critical to the enhancement of the social status and legitimacy of 
professional associations. 
Another strategy for enhancing the social legitimacy and status of the profession is 
‘subscribing to political and moral ideas of the day’ (Preston et al., 1995, p. 517).  Preston et 
al. (1995) examined the code of ethics of the US accounting profession and argued that 
American accountants presented themselves as ethical professionals upholding progressive 
political ideologies, such as democracy and pragmatism, which were seen as a solution to 
various social and economic problems in the early 20th century.  This established the 
legitimacy of their professional status in American society.  In line with this US finding, as 
British professional organisations developed, their members were perceived as trustworthy, 
independent, and dependable (Willmott, 1986).  These studies suggest that a professional 
group’s claim to conformity with a fashionable ideology and its resultant perception as 
reliable and trustworthy were also critical to the professionalisation process. 
The strategies accountants use to differentiate themselves from other occupational groups, 
thereby enhancing their symbolic status, have also been explored from critical perspectives 
such as gender, race, and class (Kirkham and Loft, 1993; Annisette, 2003; Jacobs, 2003; 
Edwards and Walker, 2010).  Through the lens of gender, Kirkham and Loft (1993) argued 
that by the 1930s, mostly male British accountants had established their professional status in 
contrast with bookkeepers, who counted more women among their numbers.  While Kirkham 
and Loft (1993) defined accountancy as a male profession, Annisette (2003) defined it as a 
white profession, by citing the example of Trinidad and Tobago, a former British colony 
where non-white accountants struggled with entry into public practice.  Even after the 
country achieved independence and stopped importing British accountants, affiliation to the 
UK-based Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) was more valued than 
local ICATT qualifications, which Annisette (1999, 2000) labelled a colonial legacy.  To 
Jacobs (2003) and Edwards and Walker (2010), accountancy was a middle-class profession.  
Accountants in Victorian Britain adopted a middle-class lifestyle, in terms of the employment 
of domestic servants, consumption practices, and household locations (Edwards and Walker, 
2010).  Even in a contemporary setting, big accounting firms in Scotland showed subtler 
ways of preferring trainees from middle-class backgrounds to those from less privileged 
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social classes in the recruitment process (Jacobs, 2003).  These studies suggest that gender, 
race, and class have also been used as a tool to make the accounting profession more 
exclusive and thus achieve higher social status. 
However, although the sociology of professions suggests the Weberian notion of closure as a 
strategy of professionalisation in pursuit of market monopoly, a number of accounting studies 
also found openness/inclusion rather than headlong exclusion/closure (Chua and Poullaos, 
1998; Shafer and Gendron, 2005; Sian 2006; Edwards et al., 2007).  Where membership 
eligibility was too tight, rival associations could emerge, and where it was too open its 
symbolic value was diluted (Sian, 2006).  Therefore, the VIC promoted an openness policy to 
recruit more members during the first four/five years of its existence to increase its size 
(Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998).  Shafer and Gendron (2005) extended the findings of Chua 
and Poullaos (1993, 1998) by showing that the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) planned to adopt an openness policy as part of its abortive Vision 
Project in the early 2000s to pursue advantages from a larger membership.  Similarly, the 
professionalisation of Kenyan accountancy was achieved by including all qualified 
accountants, rather than by pursuing monopolistic market control (Sian, 2006).  Edwards et al. 
(2007) also indicated that ICAEW relied on the closure strategy only after the obtainment of 
the Royal Charter.  These studies suggest that not only closure/exclusion but also 
openness/inclusion can be a valid strategy in professionalisation processes, particularly at the 
early stages. 
2.2. Accounting professionalisation embedded in historical contexts 
Both the establishment and the development of professional associations are embedded in a 
historical context, and thus cannot be properly understood without considering the 
background political, social, and economic circumstances (Burchell et al., 1980; Willmott, 
1986; Puxty et al., 1987).  In this vein, many studies have explored professionalisation 
projects in political, social, and economic contexts different from those of the UK (Chua and 
Poullaos, 1993, 1998, 2002; Ballas, 1998; Hao, 1999; Sian 2006; Yee, 2009, 2012).  Chua 
and Poullaos (1993, 1998, 2002) explored the roles played by professional bodies in both the 
British imperial centre and the colonies, the British capital, and the Privy council/Colonial 
Office in London in the professionalisation of Australian accountants circa 1900, when the 
British empire reached her apex and Australians were building their own nation.  Sian (2006) 
highlighted the fact that professionalisation strategies can be different in a non-settler post-
colonial context by showing how neo-colonial and racial division in society, which she 
labelled ‘colonial imprint’, shaped the professionalisation of Kenyan accountancy after the 
country became independent in 1963.  These studies suggest that a certain historical context, 
such as the colonial history, shaped the professionalisation projects in former British colonies 
in a manner different from that of the UK. 
While most work based on Anglo-Saxon countries highlighted how accountants took 
initiatives in professionalisation projects to enhance their status and to maximise their interest 
(Willmott, 1986; Walker, 1991; Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998, 2002; Sikka and Willmott, 
1995a, 1995b), a growing body of work based on non-Anglo-Saxon cases has argued that 
other social actors played a more critical role than accountants (Ballas, 1998; De Beelde, 
2002; Yee, 2012).  Exploring how the Greek audit profession was created after the Second 
World War, Ballas (1998) argued that its professionalisation project was initiated by the 
Greek state, which tried to use the profession to increase tax revenue, manage society, and 
establish its authority.  De Beelde (2002) extended this line of study by examining the case of 
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professionalisation of Belgian auditors.  He also found that, whereas the professionals played 
limited roles, politicians played critical roles in the creation of the Belgian audit profession.  
These cases suggested that, while the state/politicians had the power to mould the profession 
according to their interests, the accountants/auditors’ role could be rather more limited than 
that of other actors in the professionalisation process in Continental Europe.  These findings 
contrast with the Anglo-Saxon context, where accountants played more proactive roles.   
Professionalisation in East Asian nations, such as Japan and China, shows historical 
trajectories different to the Western settings.  Sakagami et al. (1999) argued that Japan’s 
history and culture, and certain features of the nation’s business and society shaped the 
current form of the accounting profession, such as the absence of the accounting profession in 
management accounting and the public sector accounting field, and the subordination of the 
profession to the state.  Hao (1999) and Yee (2009, 2012) explored the professionalisation 
process of Chinese accountants after China opened up her economy in the 1980s.  They found 
that Chinese accountants were not proactive enough to take the initiative, but were 
subordinate to the state, and thus were not able to form a self-regulating body (Hao, 1999).  
Traditional Confucian ideology shaped the state-profession relationship parallel to the father-
son relationship, and thus state hegemony over the accounting profession was taken for 
granted.  In the 1990s, the Chinese accounting profession was shaped by the directives of a 
single political leader, to wit, Zhu Rongji, who mandated the merger of the Chinese 
Association of Certified Public Auditors and Chinese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants in the socialist/corporatist country (Yee, 2012).  This Chinese case contrasts 
sharply with Anglo-Saxon cases, in which accountants, such as George Edwards, the 
president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario and the president of the 
Dominion Association of CAs in Canada circa 1900, played crucial roles in 
professionalisation (Richardson, 2000).  This contrast suggests that accounting 
professionalisation in a given country cannot be properly understood without considering the 
political, social, and economic context and history. 
In a more contemporary context, the literature has explored the effects of late 20th-century 
globalisation/neo-liberalisation (Sikka and Willmott, 1995a; Caramanis, 1999, 2002; Yee, 
2012; Yapa et al., 2017).  Sikka and Willmott (1995a) argued that supranational pressures, 
such as directives from the EC in their case, affected the profession’s practice and status.  
Caramanis (1999, 2002, 2005) extended the work of Sikka and Willmott (1995a) by showing 
how the Greek audit market was liberalised by US and EU political-economic pressure in the 
1990s, when neo-liberal discourses permeated the political and economic fields.  Yee (2012) 
examined Chinese accounting professionalisation in the context of globalisation in the 1990s, 
when China was transitioning to the globalised market economy, and argued that the state-
profession relationship in professionalisation can be ‘much more complex in a globalised 
context’ (p. 429).  Yapa et al. (2017) found that neo-liberal pressure from international 
agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank, led Sri Lanka towards an open market economy, 
which allowed international accounting/audit firms to compete with local firms over the local 
audit market.  These studies indicate the need to further explore professionalisation projects 
in the context of globalisation/neo-liberalisation circa 2000. 
The literature on professionalisation in political contexts has focused on the relationship 
between the profession and the stateii (Willmott, 1986; Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998, 2002).  
Willmott (1986) argued that ‘professional associations are formed and developed within 
relations of power that they seek to shape as well as exploit’ (p. 561), and thus the success of 
professionalisation is dependent on recognition and acceptance by the state.  In particular, the 
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mutual dependence between professional organisations and the state reinforces the 
relationship between them as they support each other.  Chua and Poullaos (1993) explored 
the professionalisation of Australian accountants between 1885 and 1906, and concluded that 
professions and the state ‘mutually influence, help create and are shaped by each other’ (p. 
695).  However, they also pointed out that professionalisation is not a process with a certain 
end-state, but is an ongoing project that both the profession and the state mutually engage in.  
Sikka and Willmott (1995b) argued that a close relationship existed between the UK 
accountancy profession and the state by showing that audit failures and scandals resulted 
neither in the prosecution of partners nor in the debarment of audit firms from practice.  
Sikka and Willmott (1995b) derogatively labelled this relationship ‘the close and indulgent 
relationship’, and an ‘enduring and institutionalised relationship of indulgence’.  These 
studies suggest that a close relationship between the profession and the state is critical, and 
thus should be carefully examined to fully understand the professionalisation process. 
This review of literature suggests a need to explore how a professional association and its key 
members 1) define, control, and claim their knowledge; 2) adopt a policy of closure and/or 
openness to enhance their status/influence, particularly at the early stages; and 3) respond to 
structural/institutional forces from international organisations or the state in a particular 
historical context, such as a globalised/neo-liberalised setting.  To answer these questions, we 
attempt to explore how KAGA was formed in response to neo-liberal pressure from the IMF 
for public sector accrual accounting circa 2000.  In particular, we examine how KAGA’s key 
founders included or excluded other social actors and negotiated with the state to define and 
claim their knowledge and enhance their legitimacy, status and power.   
3. Theory 
In providing a credible (hi)story of professionalisation of Korean public sector accounting, 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical lens helps us develop our narrative, interpretation and 
explanation of the creation and development of KAGA (Parker, 1999).  Bourdieu is notable 
for refusing to be categorised as either a structuralist or a constructivist.  Instead, he always 
sought to recognise both the constructed nature of institutions and the institutional nature of 
constructive identity.  However, the review of Malsch et al. (2011) suggests that, while 
Bourdieu’s concepts have been widely adopted in the accounting literature, the core 
constructivist concept of ‘habitus’ has been less broadly utilised than the structural elements 
of ‘field’ and ‘capital’.  This finding accounts for the tendency within the accounting 
literature to read Bourdieu as a structuralist, which we argue is a product of this unbalanced 
application of his work.  
We contend that Bourdieu’s theoretical notions provide the tools to explore how social actors 
strategically deploy their capital in their struggles.  Bourdieu argues that professions are 
located in a social space of multiple fields and actors.  The social space and fields are run by 
‘the objective consensus on the sense of the world’, which Bourdieu called doxa, comprising 
elements such as unquestioned traditions and customary law (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 167).  This 
taken-for-granted doxa reproduces ‘the objective structure of the relations between the 
positions occupied by the agents or institutions’ within a social space (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 105).  In the accounting field, there is a doxa that CPA/CA-qualified 
accountants are more reliable, trustworthy independent and dependable than unqualified 
accountants and bookkeepers, and this doxa reproduces the social structure wherein the 
former occupied more dominant positions than the latter. 
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The counterpart of doxa at the structural level is habitus at the individual level, which is 
defined as ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72).  This definition shows the 
reciprocality of doxa and habitus.  Habitus is a structured structure (doxa in a social structure 
now embodied in human actors), but it is simultaneously a structuring structure as it sustains 
and reinforces particular doxic norms or practices in a field.  Social actors’ habitus is 
unconsciously produced and reproduced by their upbringing, inculcation, training, and 
experiences, which reflect particular doxa, thereby reinforcing and perpetuating a social 
structure of dominant actors and dominated actors (Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992).  In the accounting field, the habitus of CPA/CA-qualified accountants, formed by their 
education, training, and socialisation, is different from the habitus(es) of unqualified 
accountants and bookkeepers, and reproduces and perpetuates the former group’s dominance 
through their various practices.  
A field is defined as ‘an arena of permanent struggles and conflicts’ for power and status 
(Wacquant, 1987, p. 72).  The key strategy of actors for winning these struggles is to 
distinguish themselves by mobilising and deploying their resources, which Bourdieu calls 
(different forms of) capital: economic, social, cultural, and symbolic (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  Economic capital is similar to the Marxist notion of capital 
(Wacquant, 1987).  It is simply money (Bourdieu, 1977).  Described in more detail, it is 
‘immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the form of 
property rights’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 243).  Economic capital can be converted into other types 
of capital.  For example, children of an affluent family are more likely to perform better in 
schools than those from a poor family.  This differentiation indicates that economic capital 
can generate cultural capital, which is constitutive of knowledge, skills, techniques, and 
language proficiency (Bourdieu, 1986).  In the career paths of UK accountants, those from 
working-class family backgrounds admitted to the elite profession were not as successful as 
their peers from more affluent and privileged family backgrounds (Friedman et al., 2015).  
Social capital is defined as ‘the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition or in other words, to membership in a group’ (Bourdieu, 1986, 
p. 248).  The social capital of an actor is mobilised when other actors feel obligated to work 
for them just because they belong to the same group (Bourdieu, 1986).  In the accounting 
field, CPA/CA-qualified accountants can activate their social capital through their 
professional networks, and thus Canadian accountants/auditors were able to mobilise 
resources via their CA networks to dominate the field of public sector performance 
measurement (Gendron et al., 2007).   
Symbolic capital is the recognition of the capital that generates legitimacy and status in a 
field, thereby enhancing prestige and reputation (Bourdieu, 1985).  It is defined as ‘any 
property (any form of capital whether economic, cultural, or social) when it is perceived by 
social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to 
recognise it, to give it value’ (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 8).  In other words, if other forms of capital 
are ‘perceived and recognised as legitimate’, they can be symbolic (Bourdieu 1985, p. 724).  
However, this transformation into symbolic capital is most likely to occur with cultural 
capital.  Cultural capital that often becomes symbolic includes educational and professional 
designations, such as ‘Dr’ and ‘CA/CPA’, which represent the holders’ advanced knowledge 
(Bourdieu 1985, p. 724).  These designations/qualifications have legitimate, institutionalised, 
legal, and symbolic capital because the educational system guarantees the value of their 
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knowledge (Bourdieu 1985).  The symbolic capital of the official designation is maximised 
when given by the state, because ‘[t]he state is the culmination of a process of concentration 
of different species of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 4).  Therefore, social actors continuously 
wage ‘symbolic struggles’, struggles to have other actors recognise the legitimacy of their 
capital, in pursuit of ‘symbolic violence’, whereby other actors take their dominance for 
granted without questioning (Bourdieu, 1991).   
These theoretical notions are not without limitations, in particular with regard to habitus.  
Bourdieu’s definition of habitus was not definite.  His later definitions of it as ‘practical sense 
for what is to be done in a given situation’ or ‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1998) were more 
concerned with individual agency, whereas the earlier definition in Bourdieu (1977) focused 
on its role of perpetuating social structure, which could lead readers to understand Bourdieu 
as a social determinist or structuralist (Everett, 2002).  In the discipline of sociology, 
Burawoy (2012) criticised the notion of habitus as ‘unknowable and unverifiable’, and 
argued that ‘Bourdieu never gives us the tools to examine what a given individual’s habitus 
might be’ (p. 204).  These limitations have resulted in ‘the almost total inattention to habitus’ 
in organisational studies (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008, p. 2), and its infrequent use in 
accounting research (Malsch et al., 2011), although it is a core concept of Bourdieu’s 
framework, and its omission would inhibit the full theoretical advantages of deploying his 
ideas (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). 
We argue that the usefulness of Bourdieu’s comprehensive framework based on habitus in 
linking macro-structural setting and micro-individual agency still surpasses these limitations 
in the current research.  We expect that habituses of different social actors produced in 
different fields underpin their struggles to define accrual accounting knowledge and practice 
in the public sector field.  We also expect that they strategically mobilise and deploy not only 
technical accounting knowledge (cultural capital), but also funding (economic capital), 
networks and connections (social capital), and qualifications and designations (symbolic 
capital) in their struggles to pursue legitimacy, power, and status in the field.  Therefore, we 
argue that this theorisation beyond the professional association of accountants helps us tease 
out how key social actors constructed and represented their accrual accounting knowledge, 
whom they co-opted or cooperated with, under whose sponsorship, and how they presented 
KAGA and themselves. 
4. Research context and method 
We examine 10 years of the professionalisation project starting from 1997/98, when the 
Asian financial crisis broke out.  The crisis began in Thailand, but it soon spread to other 
Asian countries including Korea (Arnold, 2012).  Despite her relatively strong long-term 
solvency, Korea had a liquidity problem, which led to an IMF rescue package conditional on 
structural changes and reforms (Cumings, 1998).  While major reforms were undertaken 
mostly in the private sector (in particular, the financial sector in which the crisis broke out) 
(IMF, 1997), the IMF also promoted NPM-style public sector reforms, particularly 
recommending that the Korean government shift from cash to accrual accounting (IMF, 
2001).iii  As a result of the IMF’s recommendation, public sector accounting reform became 
an agenda item for the new administration that began its term in February 1998.  It was 
decided that public sector accrual accounting would be implemented by the central, 
provincial and local governments.  This decision was later enforced by the 2005 revision to 
the Local Finance Act and the 2007 revision to the National Account Act.  As such, there was 
a shift from the existing doxic practice of cash accounting to accrual accounting.  
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We argue that this shift created an interesting context, because the accounting literature 
suggests that accountants who hold the required technical knowledge are expected to be 
associated with this accounting initiative (Hood, 1995; Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley 
et al., 2009).  However, the Korean public sector has been historically dominated by public 
servants who were not qualified accountants.  Therefore, we expected a jurisdictional conflict 
over accrual accounting between accountants and public servants at a practical level, and 
between accounting and public administration academics at an epistemic level.  However, 
what we found during fieldwork in 2010 was that these actors created KAGA in 2002, and 
that its key members were recognised as public sector accounting experts. 
Therefore, we decided to delve into a case study of KAGA’s professionalisation with a focus 
on its strategies.  For this purpose, we combined interview data and documentary sources.  
Interviews were arranged with 45 social actorsiv using a snowball method.  At the start of the 
fieldwork, we organised interviews with an incumbent research fellow at the Korean Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (KICPA), who specialised in public sector accounting, and 
with a former staff member of KAGA, who assisted its first and second presidents (from 
accounting and public administration backgrounds, respectively) from 2002 to 2004.  We 
chose these two actors because we wanted to explore KAGA’s history from both internal and 
external perspectives.  We asked these interviewees to introduce and connect us to other 
public sector accounting experts for further interviews, at which we made the same request 
repeatedly. 
Thanks to the cooperation of the participants, we were able to arrange interviews with 10 
academics, 20 accountants, and 15 public servants who were widely recognised as public 
sector accounting experts.  During the interviews, we found that the 10 academics held PhDs 
in either accounting or public administration from either Seoul National University (SNU) or 
prestigious universities in the US, and were key members of KAGA.  Among the academic 
members were four former KAGA presidents whom we named Aaron, Greg, John, and 
Henry.  While Aaron and Henry were professors of accounting, Greg and John were 
professors of public administration.  We also interviewed KICPA-qualified accountants hired 
either by governments or by private sector entities.  Most accountants did not hold PhDs, and 
non-SNU-graduates, such as Max and Wesley, more closely cooperated with KAGA’s 
academics.  Whereas Max continuously cooperated with KAGA’s key members, Wesley 
doubted the expertise of professors of public administration while recognising their 
dominance in the public sector field.  The interviewed public servants were those who passed 
public service entry examinations, worked at the central, provincial, or local governments 
with ranks ranging from public service level 8 (junior level) to level 3 (director level).  Most 
public servants did not hold PhDs, and those who closely cooperated with KAGA’s key 
members did not graduate from SNU either.  The appendix provides the list of interviewees 
and their qualifications and higher education backgrounds, which were deemed to form the 
basis of their distinct habitus and capital in a Bourdieusian framework.   
Interviews were semi-structured and we asked the interviewees about how they became 
interested and involved in public sector accounting and KAGA, and how they developed their 
public sector accounting knowledge.  Although these questions were not exactly identical to 
our research questions, we took this strategy because we believed that, as they talked about 
their experiences, they would eventually answer our research questions (Rowley, 2012).  For 
example, when one public administration professor was asked about how he became involved 
in public sector accounting, he started with the change in social atmosphere immediately after 
the financial crisis in 1997/98.  The interview data was analysed through a Bourdieusian 
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theoretical lens, particularly focusing on how KAGA’s key members accumulated and 
mobilised their capital to dominate the public sector accounting field. 
The interview data from each participant were triangulated by interviews from other 
participants, by ad hoc observations recorded in the field notes, and by documentary sources.  
The field notes written during and after each interview were useful to analyse the habituses of 
different actors.  We found that interviewees with a background in public administration were 
more sociable, hospitable, and supportive than those with an accounting background.  The 
former bought us coffee/tea during the interviews or lunch/dinner after the interviews more 
than the latter, and more actively connected us to other public sector accounting experts 
whom they esteemed highly and/or were close to them (a generator of this habitus is further 
explored in section 7.2)v.  Consequently, our fieldwork generated more interview data from 
those with a public administration background than from those with an accounting 
background.  
Among the documentary sources were KAGA’s membership forms, journal and newspaper 
articles, newsletters, invitations to conferences and workshops, and key actors’ CVs.  The 
membership forms, which KAGA’s members submitted when they joined, provided insights 
into the nature of KAGA’s composition.  KAGA created an academic journal called the 
Korean Governmental Accounting Review, which provided insight into claims to public 
sector accounting knowledge and the creation of recognised expertise.  Newspaper articles 
informed us of what Korean society was like.  KAGA’s newsletters and invitations informed 
us of KAGA’s key events.  Finally, we collected CVs, because biographical factors disclosed 
in CVs, such as key actors’ education, training, and experience, were useful to respond to the 
call of Lee (1996), who suggested that it is necessary to identify critical relationships based 
on school and university in professionalisation projects and to realise their Bourdieusian 
potential to shape both the habitus of, and the capital available to, particular social actors. 
5. Mapping out the social space and the fields 
There are a few doxic norms that have shaped Korean social structure, such as the doxic 
dominance of academics and public servants (Bourdieu, 1977).  Their taken-for-granted 
dominance is a legacy of the social classes in traditional society: the yangban (nobility), who 
were mandarins and/or scholars; the jungin (middle class), who consisted of a small number 
of skilful technicians, such as translators and accountants, the sangmin (commoners) 
comprising peasants, craftsman, and merchants (the occupational hierarchy was formed in 
this order); and the ch'ommin (the lowest class of people), who did tasks considered 
undesirable or unclean (Kwon and Leggett, 1995).  This social hierarchy was dismantled 
through Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945), the Korean War (1950–1953), and subsequent 
industrialisation.  However, ‘Korea is still influenced by its traditional past, and yangban 
culture continues as the norm’ (Robinson, 1994, p. 512).  In Bourdieusian language, yangban 
culture has remained doxic, thereby leading Koreans to take for granted the dominance of 
academics and public servants, which a yangban would choose to be in contemporary society.  
Academics and public servants are perceived to hold a social status higher than (possibly 
better-paid) engineers, businessmen, and qualified accountants.  Therefore, some Koreans 
were willing to choose ‘a less well-paid but more prestigiously named position’ in an 
academic field or in a public service field by acquiring PhDs or by passing competitive public 
service entry examinationsvi (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 733). 
The doxic yangban culture was reproduced by Koreans’ pursuit of academic qualifications in 
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prestigious universities throughout the 20th century.  In particular, the strong symbolic capital 
of degrees at the SNU provided academics with the source of their power and influence.  
SNU is a Korean version of Oxbridge that succeeded the Keijo Imperial University, one of 
the nine Imperial Universities in the Japanese Empire prior to Korea’s independence.  The 
dominance of SNU graduates has been well documented by Sorensen (1994):  
Because of the system of university admission by competitive exam, Koreans 
generally consider universities to be rankable on a monotonic scale, with Seoul 
National University at the head of the list. College graduates, too, are ranked in social 
prestige for the rest of their life by the ranking of the university they attended (p. 19) 
A Bourdieusian interpretation of Sorensen’s (1994) statement would be that an SNU degree 
endows its holders with strong symbolic capital to the extent that symbolic violence is created 
(Bourdieu, 1977), or their highest social status is not challenged by other social actors.  
Therefore, the habitus of university professors who graduated from SNU reflected this doxic 
dominance and was expected to engage public sector accrual accounting in a manner that 
could reproduce and reinforce their dominance in the academic field and broader social space. 
In the private sector, on the other hand, modern entrepreneurs emerged during Japanese 
colonial rule.  They founded companies, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG, which grew to 
be global conglomerates by the end of the 20th century.  Even after independence, Korea 
emulated the Japanese developmental state model, wherein a strong bureaucracy led 
economic development (Kohli, 1994).  This Japanese developmental state model successfully 
drove rapid economic growth until the Asian financial crisis. 
However, a downside of the developmental state model was the domination of the state and 
the bureaucracy over the private sector, which has been well documented in the public 
administration literature, such as in Im (2003): 
This hierarchical relationship between the public administration and citizens 
continued throughout the Japanese colonial and rapid economic growth periods. The 
bureaucracy has been a locomotive of the society…. The bureaucracy is strong and 
public servants, who are predominantly the elites of society, are considered wise and 
good decision-makers who hold a long-term perspective. …[I]n many fields the 
government is the only demander or supplier of some goods and services and the 
private sector remains weak and small (p. 90, 93). 
This description of the power and status of public servants suggests the doxic domination of 
the bureaucratic field over private sector fields, including the accounting field.  This 
dominance of public servants also led us to expect that the bureaucratic habitus could be 
strong enough not to let the adoption of accrual accounting, a private sector practice, lead to 
the dominance of accountants in the public sector, as has occurred in many Western countries 
(Hood, 1995; Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Gendron et al., 2007).   
In contrast with Western countries, where accounting practices ‘offer a valued source of 
personal satisfaction, collective identity, and social esteem’ (Puxty et al., 1987, p. 279), 
accounting had more instrumental and material value in Korea.  This weaker symbolic capital 
of accounting was caused partly by the perception of accountancy as an extension of the 
traditional jungin class that was subordinate to yangban.  However, the more powerful 
explanation could be from the Japanese colonial legacy, which had shaped contemporary 
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Korean society and economy (Kohli, 1994), thereby making the Korean accounting 
profession akin to the Japanese profession (Sakagami et al., 1999).  First, there was only one 
national body of professional accountants, KICPA, which was founded in October 1945, soon 
after liberation from Japanese colonial rulevii.  Due to this relatively short history, KICPA 
may not have had enough time to develop the autonomy held by professional bodies in many 
other countries.  Second, the social status of accountants was high due to the relatively 
difficult KICPA qualification examinationsviii.  Whereas the symbolic value in developing 
countries of professional credentials originating from developed countries, such as ACCA 
from the UK, has been well documented in the literature (Poullaos and Uche, 2012; Annisette, 
1999, 2000), this dominance of overseas qualifications was not found in Korea.  Here, local 
KICPA qualifications were more dominant than foreign ones because it was perceived to be 
more difficult to pass a KICPA qualification examination than overseas ones (Kim, 15 March 
2016).  Therefore, only KICPA members were allowed to use the ‘CPA’ designation, 
whereas foreign-qualified accountants refer to their ‘occupation’ as ‘accountant’ (Kim, 16 
February 2016).  This monopoly of the CPA designation suggests that the symbolic capital of 
KICPA was stronger than that of foreign qualifications.  Third, the accounting profession was 
absent from the field of public sector accounting, which was practised by public servants who 
passed the public service entry examinations.  Government auditors, who were also public 
servants, conducted audits of the national accounts, although CPA-qualified accountants 
monopolised the accounting/audit work in the economically dynamic and lucrative private 
sector, where accrual accounting had been a doxic practice.  This absence of the accounting 
profession in the public sector reflected the doxic public-private divide and the doxic 
perception that accrual accounting was a private-sector practice and accountants’ remit was 
the private sector.  Fourth, the profession conformed to the lead of or was subordinate to the 
state.  The state decided on the number of new members of KICPA each year, and the central 
government was in charge of its qualification examinations. ix   This recruitment practice 
reflected the doxic superiority of the public sector to the private sector in Korean society.  
Whereas this type of state regulation enhanced the legitimacy and status of the KICPA 
qualification because the state was the ultimate endower of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1985, 
1991, 1994), it led the accounting profession to take the dominance of the state for granted 
and subordinated the accounting habitus to the bureaucratic habitus.  Therefore, we expected 
that it would be more difficult for Korean accountants than for Western accountants to 
dominate the public sector field due to their weaker habitus, despite their possession of 
knowledge required for public sector accrual accounting.  
In essence, this field mapping indicates that academics (in particular those who graduated 
from SNU) and public servants were more dominant than accountants in the Korean social 
structure.  Finally, we argue that this Korean social cartography fits into Bourdieu’s 
framework predicated on French social space, in which ‘the field of higher civil service or the 
state, the university field, and the intellectual field’ occupied dominant positions in ‘the field 
of power’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 76). 
6. Public sector accrual accounting promoted and defined 
Enormous political, economic, and social changes began from 1997/98.  To begin with, the 
financial crisis caused many Korean banks and conglomerates to either collapse or re-
structure/re-engineer themselves, which slowed down economic growth and increased 
unemployment.  As a result of this national economic ordeal, the pro-labour progressive 
opposition party won the Presidential election in December 1997 for the first time since 
democratisation in 1987.  Kim Dae-jung, who had fought against military rule since the 
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1960s, started his five-year fixed tenure in February 1998.x  This change of government led 
civil activists, who had fought for democracy with him and thus shared habitus with him and 
his party members, to emerge as dominant social actors.  This dominance of civil activists has 
been recognised by some researchers, such as Kim (2002): 
In the case of South Korea, even during the democratic consolidation, civil society 
and mass mobilization have played crucial roles in pressuring the democratic regimes 
to continue and deepen political, economic, and social reforms and to make the 
policymaking process more transparent and accessible. Civil society in South Korea, 
in brief, continues to serve as the main driving force for social transformation (p. 67). 
This suggests that civil activists, as powerful social actors, drove political, social, and 
economic reforms, and their power gradually grew doxic.  Among the social activists were 
academics, who took powerful positions in the Presidential Office and in government 
departments to implement the required reforms.  These appointments of academics to high-
ranking posts reflected the doxa that valued academic qualifications.  In essence, the financial 
crisis and the subsequent government change brought about the dominance of academics who 
were active in civil society groups as drivers of various political, social, and economic 
reforms. 
This was the backdrop against which some professors, whom we named Bill, Greg, and John, 
took influential positions in civil society groups.  These professors were born in 1952/53, 
graduated from SNU and had known each other since their joint master’s program at the 
Graduate School of Public Administration in SNU.  They had become close friends during 
their PhD programmes.  Chris, the former KAGA staff member, testified that KAGA started 
from a private gathering of friends.  Since earning their doctorates from SNU, their teaching 
and research had focused on public financial administration.  Therefore, public sector 
financial management was the field in which these professors were able to establish dominant 
positions.  These educational backgrounds and career paths suggest that these professors 
shared a common habitus and also possessed sufficient symbolic capital to be significant in 
the academic field.  
However, they emerged as powerful social actors even outside the academic field when they 
took influential positions in significant civil society groups and advocated NPM-style public 
sector reforms.  They promoted the benefits of the NPM measures, such as public sector 
accrual accounting, since they were aware of the NPM movement in the 1980s and 1990s, 
despite their lack of technical accounting knowledge.  Bill chaired the Budget Surveillance 
Committee created within the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) to monitor 
public sector budget expenditures.  He was a standing executive committee member at CCEJ 
and also a co-representative of the Citizens’ Action Network.  Greg succeeded Bill as chair of 
the Budget Surveillance Committee.  John was an executive committee member in the 
Citizens’ Coalition for Better Government.  They suggested that public sector budget 
expenditures should be more effectively monitored and that accrual accounting was a good 
tool to make the public sector more efficient, transparent, and accountable (Ahn et al., 2014).  
Their positions in civil society groups, combined with their SNU degrees and university 
professorships, provided legitimacy and validity to the notion of public sector accrual 
accounting.  Greg and Bill recounted their experiences as follows: 
These people pushed ahead this (public sector accrual accounting). There were civil 
society groups, such as the Budget Surveillance Committee within the Citizens’ 
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Coalition for Economic Justice, whose chairperson was Prof Bill. Prof Carter was 
there as a public admin academic. I was there. Prof David (whose major was 
accounting) was there. Prof Aiden (whose major was accounting) also participated. 
There were some CPAs. But in Korea, it is the researcher groups such as professors 
who take the initiative in policy making. (Greg) 
Personally, I majored in public financial administration…. It was not because I am 
well versed at accounting, but because there had been a global wave toward public 
sector accounting reforms, which I took interest in. It was in February 1998 that I 
joined CCEJ. Even before that, I had been interested in the adoption of accrual 
accounting as a part of public sector accounting reform, which was a global trend at 
that time. (Bill) 
Greg’s statement indicates that professors were active and dominant members of the civil 
society group, and thus they were expected to ‘take the initiative in policy making’, for 
instance in implementation of public sector accrual accounting, even though not all of them 
possessed accounting knowledge, because of the symbolic violence generated by their 
academic qualifications, professorships and positions within influential civil society groups.  
As such, we suggest that this initiative can be seen as an extension of the evidently powerful 
role played by the public administration professors via civil society groups in shaping and 
directing government policy in Korea. 
Bill’s statement suggests that his involvement in civil society activities started in February 
1998, immediately after the Asian financial crisis and the Presidential election.  Further, it 
suggests that, despite lacking knowledge of accounting, he perceived public sector accrual 
accounting as part of a wider global reform trend and as an extension of their interests in 
public sector reforms.  In other words, the public administration professors had been well 
aware of the advent and growth of NPM reforms, such as implementation of accrual 
accounting since the 1980s (Hood, 1995; Anessi-Pessina et al., 2016), and began to advocate 
it via various civil society groups immediately after Korea applied to the IMF for bailout 
loans and the government changed, although they did not have a technical understanding of 
accrual accounting.  Therefore, we argue that the notion of accrual accounting was 
understood as a measure of public sector reforms rather than as an accounting initiative and 
that the professors, despite their lack of accounting knowledge, were able to legitimise their 
activities and enhance their status and privilege because they subscribed to the doxic NPM 
ideology in the face of economic and political changes (Preston et al., 1995).   
This type of advocacy, as well as the recommendation of the IMF, led to a shift from the 
existing doxic practice of cash accounting to accrual accounting.  In the early 2000s, it was 
decided to adopt accrual accounting in both central government and local governments.  This 
process was delegated to the Ministry of Finance and Economy and to the Ministry of 
Government Administration and Home Affairs (MoGAHA), respectively.  This decision was 
later enforced by the 2007 revision to the National Account Act and the 2005 revision to the 
Local Finance Act, respectively.  From this perspective, the reform was a combination of 
broader social changes, intuitional initiatives, and the agency of key individual actors. 
The two ministries respectively formed accounting standards boards in which academics, 
CPA-qualified accountants, and public servants participated and cooperated.  Aaron, an 
accounting professor who later became the inaugural president of KAGA, recalled his 
experience as follows: 
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The accounting standards board consisted of three groups: professors, both public 
admin professors and accounting professors, CPAs, and bureaucrats including 
workplace-level staff, division heads, and bureau heads. But professors took the 
initiative among these groups.  In Korea, it is not accountants but professors who take 
the initiatives. 
Aaron’s statement also suggests that, while professors (both in accounting and in public 
administration), CPA-qualified accountants, and public servants worked on drafting accrual-
based public sector accounting standards, professors (including public administration 
professors) were more dominant than other board members.  This dominance of professors, in 
accordance with Greg’s previous statement, reflects the doxic value of academic 
qualifications and represents the resultant symbolic violence, in that professors’ power was 
taken for granted, regardless of their actual possession of technical accounting knowledge. 
As accrual accounting was promoted as a measure of public sector reform by the professors 
at the epistemic level, it was defined and designed as a part of the government budget process 
at the practical level by public servants, whose habitus had dominated the public service field.  
We interviewed Toby, a public servant who participated in the accounting standards board for 
local and provincial governments.  According to Bill’s memory, Toby was ‘a deputy director 
at MoGAHA who objected to accrual accounting the most in the beginning but became an 
evangelist of accrual accounting later on’.  Whereas he initially cooperated reluctantly with 
the professors to adopt it, he was recognised later as a public sector accounting expert among 
public servants.  Toby explained how accrual accounting was defined and designed as a part 
of the government budget process: 
We draw up a budget, and then we implement that budget and settle accounts and 
produce financial statements. Accrual-based financial information is produced within 
this process. Thus regardless of adoption of accrual accounting, the budget process is 
the same. Then we argued that we should take a budgetary approach. … But what we 
did was that we made accounting categories within budgetary categories. So the 
budgetary system was able to remain as steady as it was. If it had been viewed by an 
accounting perspective and if the focus had been on accounting, there should have 
been a lot of changes in budget-oriented things, and staff would have been in trouble. 
But what we did was to stick to the budgetary categories. 
Toby’s statement suggests that accrual accounting was designed as merely a part of the 
broader government budget process, and thus accrual-based financial statements were 
regarded as an adjunct to cash-based financial statements, which continued to be produced as 
the main document.  Through a Bourdieusian lens, this definition indicates that public 
servants’ dominant habitus adopted and adapted accrual accounting to the extent that their 
dominance was not challenged in the public service field. 
The key board members piloted the newly designed accounting standards in two local 
councils in 2001 (see Ahn et al. (2014) for a detailed account) and perceived this attempt to 
be successful.  However, the drivers of public sector reforms, including public sector accrual 
accounting, grew weak, because Korea had paid off all the IMF debts by 2001, and was 
suffering from ‘reform fatigue’ from neo-liberal ‘painful restructuring’ programmes in the 
private sector (Gluck, 2001).  Consequently, the key actors faced the risk that they had 
accumulated the capital (social and cultural) for public sector accrual accounting since 
1997/98 to no avail, and thus they had to do something lest their capital become a sunk cost.  
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This was the immediate backdrop to KAGA’s formation in 2002. 
7. Formation and development of KAGA 
During our fieldwork, we found that KAGA’s professors and public servants each claimed to 
have made the most significant contribution to the public sector accounting standards-setting 
processes and/or to the formation and development of KAGA.  The other party, it was 
claimed, simply cooperated with or helped them.  We were not able to judge who made 
greater contributions, but this disagreement suggests a close relationship and interaction 
between the state and the association, which has been continuously highlighted in the 
accounting professionalisation literature (Willmott, 1986; Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998, 
2002).  Therefore, this relationship is one of the key analytical focuses in this section. 
7.1. Representation of KAGA as an accounting association 
As the public administration professors did not possess substantial accounting knowledge at 
the early stage, their key strategy was to co-opt accounting experts.  First and foremost, they 
co-opted Aaron as the inaugural president of KAGA.  Aaron had both KICPA and AICPA 
qualifications, a master’s degree from SNU, and a PhD from Indiana University.  He was also 
an accounting professor at Sung Kyun Kwan University, a top-tier university, and the vice 
president of the Korean Accounting Association in 1998/99; thus, he was able to bring 
valuable symbolic capital to KAGA.  While Aaron’s SNU degree indicates that he was a part 
of SNU’s network of public administration professors, his symbolic capital from 
KICPA/AICPA qualifications, PhD from a prestigious US university, and position as vice 
president in a top-class accounting association were critical to presenting KAGA as an expert 
group in accounting.  This strategy of co-opting Aaron was akin to that of a small number of 
founding fathers of the SAE, who co-opted a few ‘persons of considerable stature within the 
Edinburgh accounting community’ to enhance its status (Lee, 1996, p. 334).  Therefore, we 
argue that KAGA adopted a strategy of openness rather than closure from its start. 
With Aaron joining KAGA as its inaugural president, KAGA was able to co-opt more 
accounting academics and accountants through Aaron’s reputation (symbolic capital) and his 
personal connections (social capital) in the accounting field.  Greg described this strategy of 
co-opting accounting experts to form KAGA as follows: 
There are a couple of public admin academics who are doing public financial 
administration, such as Prof Bill and Prof David, and some accounting academics. But 
the number of accounting academics was small. We created KAGA in 2002, and at 
that time we co-opted accounting professors. We did that intentionally. 
Greg’s statement indicates that the public administration professors initiated KAGA and 
intentionally co-opted accounting academics to present KAGA as an accounting association 
rather than a public administration association.  One strategy for co-opting accounting 
academics was to appoint an accounting professor as president of KAGA every other year.  
Accounting professors were appointed as presidents in odd-numbered years, while public 
administration professors were appointed in even-numbered years.  For example, Aaron and 
Henry, both accounting professors, were presidents in 2003 and 2007, respectively, while 
Greg and John were presidents in 2004 and 2006, respectively.  As a result of this strategy, 




However, although Aaron became the first president of KAGA, the public administration 
professors remained its key initiators.  Evidence of this was found in the interview with Ross, 
KAGA’s first staff member who assisted both Aaron and Greg.  Ross recounted, 
As far as I know, public admin professors co-opted Prof Aaron. He was co-opted to 
be the president. But practical work was mostly done by public admin professors. As 
for Aaron, I heard that he was doing what he had been doing, but one day he received 
the request and got to do that (the job of president of KAGA). 
Ross’s statement shows that, although Aaron was KAGA’s inaugural president, most 
practical work was done by the public administration professors.  However, the public 
administration professors presented KAGA as an association open to other academics and 
professionals.  KAGA invited accounting academics, accountants, and public servants to 
participate in its inaugural conference and to join the association, but registered tax agents, 
who reviewed cash-based financial statements of local governments, were not included in the 
invited group of professionals xi .  This indicates that while openness was KAGA’s key 
strategy, it was closed to less prestigious professionals. 
The inaugural conference was organised to be run by non-public administration academics as 
a moderator, presenters, and discussants except for John, who had been working for 17 years 
for the Korean National Open University, where the event was held.  However, whereas the 
apparent actors were mostly accounting experts who possessed strong cultural and symbolic 
accounting capital, they represented the strong social capital of the key KAGA professors.  
The moderator was David, who acquired his master’s degree in accounting from the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1983, AICPA qualifications in 1986, and a 
PhD in auditing from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1987.  These academic 
qualifications gave KAGA symbolic accounting capital strong enough to attract further 
accounting experts, which was the reason key public administration academics asked him to 
lead the conference.  David accepted this request, not only because of his friendship with Bill 
but also because of his link with other public administration professors.  While David was an 
accountant, his first degree was in public administration, and he was a professor at the 
Department of Public Administration in Korea University, a top-tier university.  The 
presenters were James and Ben.  James acquired a PhD in management accounting from 
Syracuse University in 1996, had KICPA qualifications, and used to work at KPMG.  His 
accounting symbolic capital from his PhD, CPA qualification, and work experience at a big 
accounting firm was sufficiently strong to attract accounting actors to KAGA.  Ben, a junior 
to Bill within the Economics Department at SNU, acquired a PhD in economics from SNU in 
1992.  These presenters’ academic backgrounds suggest that the key public administration 
professors did not have sufficient accounting knowledge to give a presentation in 2002, but 
their personal networks and connections were sufficiently strong to mobilise the cultural 
capital of other key actors in the academic field. 
An investigation of the discussants’ academic backgrounds leads us to a similar finding. 
Henry and Logan acquired their PhDs in financial accounting from Purdue University and the 
University of Southern California, respectively, and Peter, then a highest-ranking public 
servant (public service level one) at the Korean Board of Audit and Inspection (equivalent to 
the Auditor General’s Office), had KICPA qualifications.  They were also personally 
connected via SNU.  Logan, an SNU graduate, was a very close friend of John, to the extent 
that he called John ‘brother’.  Henry, another SNU graduate, was a year junior to John at 
Kyunggi High School, the most prestigious high school in Korea in the 1960s/70s.  Peter had 
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a master’s degree from the Graduate School of Public Administration, SNU, which Bill, John, 
and Greg also attended.  While their personal connections to the key public administration 
professors were a smooth pathway to KAGA, their PhDs from prestigious US universities or 
KICPA qualifications were what KAGA sought for its inauguration.  In this perspective, 
individuals’ social capital, intertwined through personal friendships and the SNU alumni 
network, was both critical to who was included in KAGA’s inauguration and to representing 
KAGA as an accounting association rather than as a public administration association on its 
first day.  As KAGA was represented as an accounting association with extensive access to 
accounting knowledge and the symbolic capital of accounting professors, accounting PhDs, 
and KICPA/AICPA qualifications, a type of symbolic violence occurred, whereby a visitor to 
the conference would not be aware that it was controlled by public administration academics, 
but would recognise it as an expert accounting group in the public sector accounting field.   
The inaugural conference was successful in terms of member recruitment.  Among the 58 
early members of KAGA who had signed up by the end of 2003, at least 19 applied for the 
membership on the day of the inauguration. xii   The first 19 members consisted of five 
accounting academics, five public administration academics, four public servants, three CPA-
qualified accountants, and two other major academics.  This composition suggests that the 
key professors’ strategy was successful in making the new association open to accounting 
experts, while ensuring that the dominant role of public administration academics in KAGA 
was not necessarily evident to the members who joined at the inauguration.  Despite the 
dominance of the public administration professors in the establishment and leadership, as of 
2006, membership was composed of 103 accounting academics, 53 public administration 
academics, 45 public servants, and 20 CPA-qualified practitioners.  However, registered tax 
agents were invited neither to KAGA’s events nor its membership, even though they 
reviewed the cash-based financial statements of local councils prior to accrual accounting 
adoption, because they were symbolically weaker actors in Korean society.  This membership 
composition suggests that KAGA’s initiators opened the association only to those who 
possessed strong cultural and symbolic capital in the accounting field and public 
administration field, but excluded the less-respected social actors, to construct and represent 
KAGA as a symbolically powerful accounting association. 
7.2. Registration as an incorporated association and government funding 
A significant strategy for generating legitimacy as an expert group was formal state 
recognition.  Since its formal inauguration in August 2002, KAGA’s founders sought state 
recognition by having KAGA registered as an incorporated association with MoGAHA.  
There were a number of functional benefits to KAGA being an incorporated association.  
Following this, KAGA was able to operate as a legal entity and have its own bank accounts.  
Previously, KAGA had used John’s personal bank account to receive membership fees, 
which provides circumstantial evidence that John was a key founder of KAGA.  In addition, 
KAGA members were able to conduct research projects contracted out by government 
departments under the umbrella of the legal entity rather than as a group of individuals.  
However, there was also a symbolic benefit, because being an incorporated association meant 
that KAGA was authorised by the state, which is the ultimate source of symbolic capital in 
most social spaces (Bourdieu, 1985, 1991, 1994).  Therefore, registration as an incorporated 
association was critical to the construction and representation of KAGA as an expert group 
endorsed by the state. 
However, the version of this incorporation story received from academics was slightly 
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different from what public servants, such as Felix, remembered.  In 2002, Felix moved to 
MoGAHA and was assigned to the task of accrual accounting adoption.  However, its driving 
force had been growing weak, because Korea had repaid its bailout loans from the IMF by 
2001, and the anti-neoliberal and pro-labour progressive party won the Presidential election 
again in 2002.  Felix recounted the atmosphere in MoGAHA at the time, as follows: 
MoGAHA was supposed to take the initiative in this (public sector accrual 
accounting), but the atmosphere there was like ‘Accrual accounting is hard and 
difficult.’ So it had been delayed and no one took charge of this. So at that time, I 
took charge of this. At that time, I was a deputy director. Then all my deputy director 
colleagues who worked next to me were all negative, saying ‘Why do you do that?’ I 
was called to work on this, but the atmosphere was weird. 
Felix’s statement indicates that he was not able to accomplish his mission by himself within 
MoGAHA, and thus needed to mobilise driving forces from the outside.  In this situation, he 
chose to ask KAGA to support his mission.  This strategy indicates that Felix was trying to 
mobilise the cultural and symbolic capital of KAGA’s founders who were still interested in 
public sector accounting reforms, because there was a doxic ‘belief in the legitimacy of 
words’ of KAGA’s powerful academics (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 170).  In other words, MoGAHA 
needed KAGA to propagate the legitimacy of public sector accrual accounting.  Felix 
suggested that KAGA should be registered as an incorporated association with MoGAHA to 
facilitate the cooperation necessary to expedite the accrual accounting adoption process.  He 
received a positive response from KAGA and began working on KAGA’s authorisation.  He 
subsequently provided administrative support to facilitate KAGA’s incorporation, which was 
finalised in May 2003.  Most interviewees agreed that this process was extraordinarily rapid, 
considering that KAGA had been founded only in August 2002.   
Following the incorporation, MoGAHA financially supported KAGA’s activities, such as 
conferences and seminars.  MoGAHA was the main funding source for KAGA.  While 
KAGA held 17 events during for its first five years of existence, MoGAHA sponsored 14 of 
them.  Chris, a former staff member of KAGA, recounted, 
MoGAHA financed KAGA. KAGA received money not directly from MoGAHA, but 
from the Korean Local Finance Association (KLFA). KLFA is an institution which 
lends money to local governments and it might be engaged in the superannuation of 
local public servants. …. The major source of the fund came from the KLFA. 
…KLFA was completely controlled by MoGAHA. So they did whatever MoGAHA 
told them to do. Funding always came from them. 
Chris’s statement suggests that MoGAHA continuously funded KAGA’s activities via an 
organisation it controlled.  Therefore, KAGA’s presidents were able to hold seminars and 
workshops without great financial concerns, because they expected constant cash flows from 
MoGAHA.  This finding suggests that, while KAGA provided cultural and symbolic capital 
to MoGAHA by conducting accrual accounting projects contracted out by the latter, 
MoGAHA provided economic capital to KAGA.  Concerning this relationship, Lee, a 
relatively junior KAGA member, stated that ‘KAGA was set up to work with MoGAHA’, 
adding that ‘From another perspective, KAGA was established to help MoGAHA.’  Lee’s 
statement suggests that MoGAHA’s strategy to engage KAGA to work on public sector 
accrual accounting was successful, thereby enhancing the veracity of the perspective 
provided by Felix. 
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In essence, regardless of who initiated the incorporation of KAGA, whether academics or 
public servants, the stories from both sides confirm the close relationship between the 
association and the state, which was continuously reinforced by the exchange of cultural 
capital and economic capital.  Considering that the dynamics of the relationship between the 
two parties have been cemented by their mutual dependency (Willmott, 1986) and that a 
professional association’s capacity for dominance is not only dependent on its knowledge 
repositories but also on its relationship with the government (Halliday, 1987), we argue that 
the close relationship between KAGA and MoGAHA facilitated the dominance and 
legitimacy of KAGA and its founders in the public sector accounting field. 
The continuous cash flows from MoGAHA also created and/or reinforced the sociable and 
hospitable habitus of public administration professors mentioned in Section 4.  While 
KAGA’s presidents from both accounting and public administration backgrounds enjoyed 
generous funding, their management styles were different.  Chris recounted what he observed 
of the different styles as follows: 
When KAGA was founded, a fund was raised, and it was well managed when Prof 
Aaron (from an accounting background) was the first president. But Prof Greg (the 
second president from a public administration background) spent all the money. He 
left only KRW 500,000 (around GBP 300). The treasury of KAGA was empty then. 
Prof Stephen (the third president from an accounting background) filled the treasury 
of KAGA …. Prof John (the fourth president from a public administration 
background) always said ‘Okay. Okay. Good. Good’. That was his style. Money was 
not an issue.  
Chris’s statement indicates that, the constant financial support from MoGAHA helped Greg 
and John to run KAGA without financial concerns, whereas Aaron and Stephen were still 
frugal and tried to make up the deficit.  This difference in habitus between the two groups of 
professors was reflected in their expenditure and affected the establishment of rapport with 
public servants, which is examined in the subsequent section. 
7.3. Developing relationships with public servants 
KAGA was recognised as a public sector accounting expert group by public servants who 
actually practised accounting.  However, it was not only accountants and accounting 
professors but also public administration professors who were perceived as experts, although 
they did not have substantial accounting knowledge at the early stage.  This recognition of 
expertise can be partly explained by the perception of accrual accounting as belonging to the 
government budget process and as a measure of public sector reform as examined in Section 
6.  However, the close relationship between public administration professors and public 
servants (social capital) also contributed to this recognition.   
The close relationship between the public administration professors and the public servants 
was noted during a dinner with Greg, after the formal interview.  When we asked him to 
introduce us to CPA-qualified accountants in the government, he gave us the work phone 
number of a public servant at MoGAHA off the top of his head.  Greg stated, ‘Leo can be 
contacted at xxxx-xxxx. Talk to him. Tell him that you met me … And ask him to let you 
interview a CPA there.’  Greg’s memory of Leo’s work phone number and his statement 
suggest that public administration professors had a closer relationship with public servants 
than with CPA-qualified accountants. 
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This relationship had been built up via the standards-setting processes, wherein KAGA’s 
professors tried to involve workplace-level public servants.  Carl, a public servant who 
worked on accrual accounting in Metropolitan Daejon, recounted: 
Workplace-level public servants were invited to sit in on the meetings for accounting 
standards setting too. So professors and other members of accounting standards board 
asked us whether what they said was right or wrong. Sometimes we said that what 
they said was weird and then those parts were removed. Professors were too much 
oriented to theories and far away from the practice. When we said that their opinion 
was wrong, that was corrected. But sometimes, they asked us to follow their opinion 
even though that did not fit the practice, because that was the direction to go and 
should be included in the accounting standards.  
This statement by Carl shows that workplace-level public servants participated in the 
accounting standards-setting process and exchanged their practical knowledge with the 
theoretical knowledge of the professors, who were the most powerful actors in the accounting 
standards-setting process but willingly accepted the opinions of the workplace-level public 
servants.  In this way, KAGA’s professors were able to understand workplace-level practice, 
but also to share habitus with public servants, based on their mutual understanding of public 
sector attributes and the government budget process. 
The process of building up social capital and sharing habitus between public servants and the 
professors was expedited by social occasions involving alcohol, which has been a strong 
socialisation tool in Korean society.  When Aaron talked about KAGA’s cooperation with 
MoGAHA, in particular with Felix, he stated, ‘We were a good match. He drank very well.’  
Bill also testified to the process of socialisation via drinking, stating, ‘The next deputy 
director was Felix. He drank a lot with us, professors’.  These statements by professors 
suggest that socialisation through occasions involving alcohol after hours of working on 
accounting standards setting facilitated a sharing of habitus and reinforced the social capital 
between the professors and public servants (Anderson-Gough et al., 1998). 
Sharing habitus and strengthening social capital with public servants continued through 
training sessions.  While the task of training public servants was often delegated to KAGA’s 
key members via the Korean Research Institute for Local Administration (KRILA), the 
public administration professors were often better at training and communicating with public 
servants than those from accounting backgrounds.  Alex, a former researcher at KRILA, 
explained: 
In addition, the reason why they (the public administration professors) were 
acknowledged as experts among public servants is that they trained the public 
servants. … The lectures of the commercial accounting experts were very hard to 
understand. They also gave lectures to the public servants. … So, naturally, public 
admin academics joined KRILA in training public servants. They already had a 
rapport with public servants. It is harder for those who do commercial accounting to 
teach public servants by lowering the level than for public admin professors who 
already had a rapport with them.  
Alex’s statement indicates that public servants found it easier to understand public 
administration professors than accountants, as the public administration professors shared 
common habitus elements with the public servants.  The training provided by accounting 
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professors and CPA-qualified accountants, on the other hand, assumed a degree of accounting 
knowledge that did not exist.  Because of the shared understanding and their greater role in 
the training process, the public administration professors, rather than the accountants, were 
recognised as public sector accounting experts in spite of the accountants’ greater technical 
knowledge.  Therefore, we argue that shared habitus and rapport (social capital) can be as 
critical as (or more critical than) technical knowledge to the establishment of knowledge 
recognition. 
In addition to involving public servants in the standards-setting process and training them, 
KAGA continued to engage public servants by inviting them to attend KAGA’s 
conferences/seminars free of charge.  Ross, a former KAGA staff member, stated, 
I was a KAGA staff member when Prof Aaron and Prof Greg were the presidents of 
KAGA. When Prof Aaron was the president, it was the beginning of KAGA, so there 
was not much work to do. But when Prof Greg became the president, we held 
seminars 10 times. …He held a seminar even in Jeju Island (a popular tourist spot). 
Ross’s statement indicates the sudden increase in the number of seminars under Greg’s 
presidency and the attractive locations chosen.  The numbers and venues of the seminars 
suggest that MoGAHA’s generous funding allowed many events to be held in various regions, 
including popular tourist locations.  This type of funding facilitated the network building 
between KAGA’s professors and public servants.  In Bourdieusian language, economic 
capital from MoGAHA was used to build up social capital with public servants.  Chris, 
another KAGA staff member who assisted John, suggested that the increased number and size 
of seminars was not limited to Greg’s presidency: 
As I said previously, it was when public admin academics were the presidents of 
KAGA that KAGA seminars were crowded with public servants. …. For example, 
when KAGA held a summer seminar at Chonbuk Uni (which Greg had worked for) in 
2006 (when John was the president), the auditorium was very big, but it was fully 
packed with local public servants from the vicinity of Chonbuk Uni. They had hot 
debates, presented their cases for the adoption of accrual accounting. Especially there 
were heaps of questions from the floor. Because public admin academics were in 
charge, public servants rushed into the seminar.  
While both former KAGA staff members testified to the increase in the number and size of 
KAGA’s events under the presidency of public administration professors, Chris attributed it 
not only to MoGAHA’s funding but also to the rapport between the public administration 
professors and public servants.  Consequently, public servants who participated in KAGA’s 
large-scale conferences and seminars later remembered the public administration professors 
as public sector accounting experts.  This finding suggests that economic capital can 
contribute to the formation of social capital and to the further reinforcement of cultural 
capital and symbolic capital. 
7.4. Developing accounting expertise 
Although the public administration professors’ roles in powerful civil society groups and 
their leadership positions at KAGA allowed them to participate in the public sector 
accounting standards board, their lack of technical accounting knowledge at the early stage 
could have been problematic and undermined their claims to be public sector accounting 
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experts.  This was why the early involvement of recognised accounting experts, such as 
Aaron, was so critical to KAGA’s leadership. 
The public administration professors did not have sufficiently substantial accounting 
knowledge to draft accounting standards at the early stage, but they were able to rely on the 
technical knowledge of the accounting professors.  When John was asked about the 
standards-setting process, he stated, 
Prof Aaron was the president [of KAGA], so he worked very hard. And under him, 
Prof Henry and Prof Logan did most of the practical work. Prof Henry worked on the 
balance sheet part, and Prof Logan worked on formats of the financial statements. 
John’s statement suggests that most of the work that required technical accounting knowledge 
was conducted by the accounting professors, such as Henry and Logan.xiii  However, the 
drafts of accounting standards were published in KAGA’s name, and thus KAGA’s key 
professors, regardless of their technical accounting knowledge and their actual contribution to 
the standards-setting process, were increasingly seen as public sector accounting experts, in 
particular, when they took KAGA’s presidency.  As such, the social capital associated with 
KAGA was transformed into symbolic capital, as the non-accountants were able to ‘offer the 
appearance of expert knowledge and technical efficacy’ in public sector accounting (Halliday 
and Carruthers, 1996, p. 409). 
However, we are not suggesting that these individuals did not engage in personal study and 
efforts to better understand accounting.  Alex, who was an active KAGA member, described 
the strategies adopted to enhance their accounting knowledge as follows: 
It is true that they (the public administration professors) exerted a lot of effort in it. 
Have you met Prof John? As you know, they really studied hard. Objectively 
speaking, they are no less than experts, because they have been working on this for 
more than 10 years by now. … Prof Greg and Prof John attended courses for AICPA 
to learn the American accounting system in private academic institutes. They also 
prepared for AICPA exams.  
Alex’s statement shows that the public administration professors acquired accounting 
knowledge as they studied accounting informally and formally (including completing some 
AICPA courses).  In addition, KAGA’s leadership ran monthly workshops, wherein public 
administration professors were taught accounting by the accountants, while public 
administration professors taught the accountants about the government budget process and 
public sector reform context.  Here we argue that these workshops played an important role in 
the reinforcement of the tie between accounting professors and public administration 
professors because the expansion of professional knowledge is ‘one of the privileged sites of 
the reproduction of social capital’ (Dezalay, 1995, p. 343).  
In addition to this knowledge acquisition and expansion process, their claim to accounting 
expertise was institutionalised through the establishment of a new academic journal issued by 
KAGA, the Korean Governmental Accounting Review, and its publication of academic 
papers.  The Korean Governmental Accounting Review was the only academic journal 
specialising in the discipline of public sector accounting in Korea.  Greg published six papers 
and John published four papers in it.  As such, the establishment of and the publication of 
papers in the Korean Governmental Accounting Review was an important tool for securing 
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their claim to public sector accounting expertise.  
In addition to the Korean Governmental Accounting Review, public administration professors 
published public sector accounting papers in top-tier public administration journals.  Greg 
published in the Korean Public Administration Review and the Korean Society and Public 
Administration; John published in the Korean Public Administration Review; and Bill 
published in the Korean Journal of Public Administration and the Korean Society and Public 
Administration.  Through these publications, public administration professors mobilised their 
cultural capital from the public administration field to enhance their reputations as experts in 
the public sector accounting field, and then, mobilised their growing expertise in public 
sector accounting to enhance their standing in the public administration field.  From this 
perspective, we argue that the cultural and symbolic capital from each field was mutually 
reinforcing, thereby establishing the legitimacy and power of these professors. 
Consequently, the professors’ dominance and significance were recognised by other actors in 
the field, including accounting professors, public servants, and CPA-qualified accountants.  
Among the accountants were Max and Wesley, who worked on public sector accrual 
accounting projects.  Whereas Max had continuously cooperated with the professors, Wesley 
stopped working with them.  However, both Max and Wesley testified to the dominance of 
the key professors: 
But wherever people gathered together, they knew one another. Whatever committee 
of the government was made up, most of the members were graduates of SNU. They 
all knew one another. (Max, a CPA) 
They (the dominant public administration professors) are all intertwined through 
personal networks. The personal network is the KAGA network and the Mafia 
network of the Graduate School of Public Administration at SNU. Sorry for this 
expression, but I regard them as a Mafia. Sorry to say this…. But they are closely 
linked and act as if they were one. (Wesley, a CPA) 
These statements of Max and Wesley, who did not graduate from SNU, confirmed that 
KAGA’s key professors, who graduated from SNU, were the most dominant group in the 
public sector accounting field.  The power and dominance of the key professors’ intertwined 
personal networks (social capital) was visible to the less dominant CPA-qualified accountants, 
who possessed functional accounting knowledge and technical skills to practise accrual 
accounting.  The dominance and ties of KAGA’s key professors were so powerful that 
Wesley labelled them a ‘Mafia’.  This labelling suggests that the dominance of the professors 
was perceived by less dominant actors to be reinforcing and reproducing their power and 
status in the public sector accounting field.  This finding indicates that KAGA politically 
functioned ‘as instruments of domination (or, more precisely, of legitimation of domination)’ 
for the key professors (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 80). 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we aimed to explore how an accounting association and its key members 1) 
define, control, and claim their knowledge; 2) adopt a closure or openness policy to enhance 
their status/influence, in particular, at an early stage; and 3) respond to structural/institutional 
forces from international organisations or the state, in a particular historical context, such as a 
globalised/neo-liberalised setting.  For this purpose, we explored the early history of KAGA, 
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in particular, its economic, social, and political backgrounds, and the strategies of its key 
founders.  We found that among the founders were public administration professors who 
graduated from SNU, advocated public sector accrual accounting via civil society groups, and 
strategically established and developed KAGA.  Despite their lack of technical accounting 
knowledge at the early stage, they were later recognised as public sector accounting experts.   
The professors’ claim to public sector accounting knowledge and their dominance in the field 
was successful because their strategies fit the historical context.  First, the professors had 
been aware of NPM-style reforms in the 1980s/90s.  They advocated the notion of public 
sector accrual accounting via civil society groups immediately after Korea applied to the IMF 
for bailout loans and a new government was formed in 1997/98, thereby making public sector 
accrual accounting doxic.  In other words, the professors proactively used the notion of public 
sector accrual accounting in response to the structural forces from IMF recommendations.  
Second, the professors understood public sector accrual accounting as a measure of public 
sector reform and, in conjunction with public servants, defined and designed it as a part of the 
broader government budget process rather than as an accounting initiative, thereby making 
technical accounting knowledge less critical.  Otherwise, CPA-qualified accountants and 
accounting professors might have monopolised public sector accounting in the practical and 
epistemic domain, respectively.  Third, the founders adopted an openness policy up to a 
certain extent to increase the association’s size and influence.  They co-opted accounting 
professors and CPA-qualified accountants through their personal connections and based on 
shared educational backgrounds at the association’s early stages to represent the association 
as a public sector accounting experts’ group.  However, less-respected registered tax agents, 
who used to review cash-based financial statements of local governments, were excluded.  
The review work of accrual-based financial statements was now open only to CPA-qualified 
accountants.  This finding suggests that social status based on education and qualifications 
can be a tool of closure. 
The legitimacy and power of KAGA and its key founders was enhanced in the public sector 
accounting field and in broader Korean society by its registration as an incorporated 
association with the government (symbolic capital), by mobilisation of financial resources 
from the government (economic capital), and by reinforcement of the rapport with public 
servants (social capital).  KAGA’s key founders involved workplace-level public servants in 
the accounting standards-setting process, trained them, and invited them to KAGA’s seminars 
free of charge.  Simultaneously, the public administration professors acquired accounting 
knowledge and institutionalised it in the form of academic journal articles (cultural capital).  
Consequently, KAGA’s key founders were able to be recognised as public sector accounting 
experts regardless of the possession of technical accounting knowledge at the early stage.   
The findings of this study contribute to the existing accounting literature by confirming our 
existing knowledge and also by challenging our taken-for-granted assumptions.  To begin 
with, we confirm the importance of exploring the economic, social, and political contexts, in 
which accounting professionalisation takes place (Burchell et al., 1980; Willmott, 1986; 
Puxty et al., 1987; Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998, 2002; Ballas, 1998; Hao, 1999; Sian 2006; 
Yee, 2009, 2012).  KAGA’s formation and development would have been impossible without 
the financial crisis and the change of government in 1997/98, and may have taken different 
forms in other cultural settings than those of Korea, which doxically valued academia, public 
service, civil society activities, and SNU graduates.  Second, we recognise the symbolic 
elements, such as status and legitimacy, in addition to economic rewards, as critical to a 
professionalisation project (Richardson, 1987; Walker, 1991; Chua & Poullaos, 1993, 1998; 
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Lee 1996; Annisette, 1999; Edwards et al., 2007; Poullaos, 2016).  KAGA’s key founders 
tried to have the government endorse their association and shape it as an expert group, which 
enhanced the legitimacy and status of the association and themselves.  Third, we confirm the 
significance of the close relationship between the state and the profession (Willmott, 1986; 
Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998, 2002).  Mutual dependency between KAGA and MoGAHA 
was critical both to the implementation of public sector accrual accounting via contracting 
out standards-setting projects and to the development of the association via funding and 
endorsement by the state.  Finally, we confirm the importance of representing an association 
as a reliable and trustworthy expert group (Willmott, 1986) and of subscribing to the popular 
ideology of the age (Preston et al., 1995; Caramanis, 1999).  KAGA’s founders advocated 
public sector accrual accounting as a measure of neo-liberal NPM ideology to make the 
government more efficient, transparent, and accountable, which was in fashion immediately 
after the financial crisis in 1997/98.  After they founded KAGA, they actively propagated the 
symbolic capital of the association, such as PhDs and AICPA/KICPA qualifications held by 
its key members and endorsement by the state, thereby representing the association as a 
reliable and trustworthy expert group in the public sector accounting field.  
In addition to confirming our existing knowledge, our findings can challenge the taken-for-
granted links and assumptions in the existing accounting literature.  First, we challenge the 
taken-for-granted bond between the accounting profession and the accounting association 
(Willmott, 1986; Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998, 2002; Walker, 2004a, 2004b; Samuel et al., 
2005; Fogarty et al., 2006).  The accounting profession and professional associations have 
been interchangeably used in the accounting literature, because the accounting profession has 
been represented by professional bodies of accountants (Richardson, 1987; Walker, 1991, 
2004a, 2004b; Poullaos, 2016).  However, we found that, while KAGA was represented as an 
accounting association, it was controlled by non-accounting founders.  This finding suggests 
that an apparent accounting association does not necessarily represent the accounting 
profession.  An apparent accounting association neither necessarily represents accountants 
nor aims to enhance accountants’ status and power.  Therefore, we need to rethink what the 
accounting profession is by shifting from a taken-for-granted focus on a professional 
association to broader fields. 
Second, we challenge the taken-for-granted link between accounting knowledge and 
accountants and the taken-for-granted expectation that the public sector reforms enhance the 
power and legitimacy of the accounting profession.  Previous accounting studies assumed 
that the accounting profession monopolised technical accounting knowledge (Abbott, 1988; 
Walker, 1991, 2004a, 2004b; Samuel et al., 2005), and thus accountants who exclusively 
possessed knowledge required for public sector reform become dominant actors in the public 
sector (Hood, 1995; Power, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2009).  However, we found 
that public administration professors and public servants defined and claimed public sector 
accounting knowledge to maintain their power and legitimacy in the public sector field.  The 
Korean accounting profession was less interested in the public sector than the private sector 
because the private sector is more profitable and lucrative than the public sector.  This finding 
suggests that accounting knowledge is transferrable to other social actors than accountants 
and public sector reforms do not necessarily enhance the power and legitimacy of the 
accounting profession. 
Finally, we found Bourdieusian notions of doxa and habitus, which had not been widely used 
in the accounting literature, to be useful in addition to popular notions of capital and field in 
research on accounting professionalisation (Malsch et al., 2011).  Relying on the notions of 
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doxa and habitus, we explored how the social structure was formed in Korea, where the 
accounting field was less valued than the academic field and bureaucratic field, and how 
public sector accrual accounting was defined and designed to maintain the dominance of 
public servants and public administration academics in the public sector field.  This finding 
suggests that neither the definition of accounting knowledge nor that of accounting practice is 
fixed, but that both can be formed and shaped depending on the habitus of dominant social 
actors. 
This paper is not without limitations.  We were not able to judge whether public sector 
accrual accounting was a success story or not.  While it has been implemented in central, 
provincial, and local governments and accrual-based financial statements were produced in 
addition to cash-based budgetary accounting statements, we were not capable of judging 
whether the public sector became more efficient, transparent, and accountable as suggested 
by its advocates.  However, the power and legitimacy of the advocates had been evidently 
enhanced. 
This case study was conducted in a Korean cultural context, and thus the results of this paper 
are not readily generalisable to other cultural settings.  However, we argue that the ‘thick 
description’ of the Korean case in the paper will allow readers to consider the applicability of 
our findings to ‘other settings in which they themselves operate or with which they are 
familiar’ (Parker and Northcott, 2016, p. 1117).  In particular, further research into 
professionalisation projects in cultural settings, where both structural forces and individual 
agency are to be examined, and where symbolic elements are as critical as functional 
accounting knowledge and technical skills, is expected to contribute to our understanding of 
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Appendix. Interview participants 
English 
pseudonyms 
Position Qualification Education at 
SNU 
Date and length 
of interview  
Academics 
1) Aaron Professor in accounting,  




Master (M)  10 Mar 2010 
52 minutes 
2) Greg Professor in public 
administration (PA), 
2004 KAGA president 
PhD Bachelor (B), 
M and PhD 
25 Feb 2010  
69 minutes 
3) John Professor in PA 
2006 KAGA president 
PhD B, M and PhD 16 Mar 2010 
88 minutes 
4) Henry Professor in accounting,  
2007 KAGA president 
PhD B 20 Mar 2010 
No recording 
5) Ross Former KAGA staff 
member 
PhD M and PhD 4 Feb 2010 
30 minutes 
6) Chris Former KAGA staff 
member 
PhD M and PhD 22 Jun 2010 
48minutes 
7) Bill Professor in PA PhD B, M and PhD 14 June 2010 
71 minutes 
8) Eldon Senior research fellow, at 
KRILA  
PhD None 7 July 2010 
No recording 
9) Alex Professor in PA PhD B 7 July 2010 
47 minutes 
10) Lee Professor in PA PhD None 23 Feb 2010 
98 minutes 
CPAs 
11) Wesley CEO of a small 
accounting firm 
PhD/KICPA None  26 Mar 2010 
102 minutes 
12) Max Partner at Baker Tilly KICPA None 7 Apr 2010 
54 minutes 
13) Justin Research fellow at 
KICPA 
KICPA B 4 Feb 2010 
46 minutes 
14) Blake Accountant at PwC KICPA B 5 Feb 2010 
34 minutes 
15) Tony Public service level 5 KICPA None 18 Feb 2010 
No recording 
16) Jason Manager at KPMG KICPA B 19 Feb 2010 
40 minutes 
17) Alison Public service level 5 KICPA None 2 Mar 2010 
34 minutes 
18) Jeff Accountant at KICPA KICPA B 3 Mar 2010 
31 minutes 
19) Frank Public service level 5 KICPA/ 
AICPA 




20) Andrew Manager at PwC KICPA B 6 Apr 2010 
23 minutes 
21) Shelley Senior manager  
at Baker Tilly 
KICPA None 10 May 2010 
51 minutes 
22) Eric Public service level 4 KICPA None 11 May 2010 
77 minutes 
23) Tyson Public service level 6 KICPA None 7 Jun 2010 
27 minutes 
24) Jacob Manager at Baker Tilly KICPA None 8 Jun 2010 
60 minutes 
25) Emma Junior accountant 
at Baker Tilly 
KICPA None 
26) William Junior accountant at 
Baker Tilly 
KICPA None 
27) Mason Junior accountant  
at Baker Tilly 
KICPA None 
28) Jay Junior accountant  
at Baker Tilly 
KICPA None 
29) Wood Public service level 5 KICPA None 11 Jun 2010 
38 minutes 
30) Wise Public service level 6 KICPA None 24 Jun2010 
39 minutes 
Public servants without CPA qualifications 
31) Felix Public service level 4 
Central government 
None None 4 Mar 2010 
55 minutes 
32) Linda Public service level 7 
Local council 
None None 26 Feb 2010 
58 minutes 
33) Leo Public service level 6 
Central government 
None None 3 Mar 2010 
57 minutes 
34) Sean Public service level 6 
Central government 
None B 16 Mar 2010 
10 minutes 
35) Neil Public service level 3 
Central government 
None None 18 Mar  2010 
No recording 
36) Shane Public service level 3 
Central government 
None None 31 Mar 2010 
No recording 
37) Harry Public service level 5 
Local council 
None None 19 Apr 2010 
59 minutes 
38) Naomi Public service level 7 
Local council 
None None 20 Apr 2010 
No recording 
39) Toby Public service level 4 
Central government 
None None 26 Apr 2010 
58 minutes 
40) Emily Public service level 8 
Local council 
None None 13 May 2010 
53 minutes 
41) Carl Public service level 5 
Provincial government 
None None 17 May 2010 
69 minutes 
42) Jane Public service level 5 
Central government 




43) Song Public service level 5 
Central government 
Lawyer None 24 Jun 2010 
18 minutes 
44) Jack Public service level 5 
Central government 
None B and M 12 Jul 2010 
No recording 





                                                          
i A basic doctrine of NPM was ‘lessening or removing differences between the public and the private sector’ 
(Hood, 1995, p. 94), and accrual accounting, which used to be perceived as a private sector practice, was now 
recommended to be adopted in the public sector. 
ii The state can be defined as ‘the authority of hierarchical control, as operationalised by career civil servants … 
vested in agreed rules and procedures backed up by the state's monopoly of legitimate coercion’. (Puxty et al., 
1987, p. 275) 
iii  Public sector accrual accounting was a rather minor reform agenda compared with large-scale re-
structuring/re-engineering programmes in financial and corporate sectors, and thus it was not even mentioned in 
the Letter of Intent of the Government of Korea to the IMF (IMF, 1997). In this letter, the Korean government 
promised to strengthen accounting standards and disclosure rules in line with generally accepted accounting 
principles, to ensure the transparency of financial transactions, and to reduce scope for corruption, but these 
promises were all related to the financial and corporate sectors.  
iv  English pseudonyms were used for all of the individuals discussed in this paper to protect individual 
confidentiality. 
v This difference in habitus we felt at the interviews was also confirmed by KAGA’s other former staff member 
whom we called Chris, who testified to the difference in expenditure behaviour of KAGA’s presidents from 
accounting and public administration backgrounds. 
vi The competition rate even increased after the financial crisis broke out, because of the job security provided 
by the public service (Yoon, 1998). 
vii While KICPA was formally established in 1954, its predecessor, Chosun Institute of Accountants, was formed 
in 1945 (http://www.kicpa.org/). Chosun is the name of the dynasty that ruled over Korea prior to Japanese 
colonisation.  
viii The phrase, ‘professionals, such as lawyers, CPAs, and doctors… with economic power, job security, and 
social status’ was frequently used in South Korean newspaper articles. Therefore, young adults in their 20s/30s 
were willing to ‘invest a couple years while young to be quite well off for the rest of life’ (Yoo and Seo, 2006). 
ix The power of the state over even individual accountants was recognised by Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes of World Bank (2003), which stated that ‘MoFE (Ministry of Finance and Economy) has 
the formal power to take a disciplinary measure against individual CPAs’. (p. 12) 
x It was an irony that this government elected with strong support from the working class had to implement neo-
liberal re-engineering/re-structuring that adversely affected its supporters. 
xi While what they did could be classified as ‘audit’, a legal term for it was ‘review’ because an audit of a local 
government’s accounts should be officially done by the Korean Board of Audit and Inspection (equivalent to the 
Auditor General’s Office). 
xii Among 58 early members, 11 did not fill in the date of membership application. 
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xiii However, CPA-qualified accountants and public servants remembered themselves as doing most of the 
practical work, while the professors simply gave them directions. 
